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Abstract
The goal of this paper is twofold. First, we argue that the understanding one has of
a proposition or a propositional content of a representational vehicle is a species of
what contemporary epistemologists characterise as objectual understanding. Second,
we demonstrate that even though this type of understanding differs from linguistic
understanding, in many instances of successful communication, these two types of
understanding jointly contribute to understanding a communicated thought.
Keywords Propositional understanding · Linguistic understanding · Objectual
understanding · Understanding and luck
1 Introduction
Grigory Perelman proved the Poincaré conjecture. As a competent English speaker,
you understand what you have just read. You have read that Grigory Perelman proved
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the Poincaré conjecture. We call this kind of understanding, however one would like
to characterise it in detail,1 linguistic understanding.
Linguistic understanding of a given utterance differs fromunderstanding of a propo-
sition expressed by this utterance.2 To understand the proposition Grigory Perelman
proved the Poincaré conjecture, it is not sufficient to recognize, that this is what utter-
ances of the English sentence ‘Grigory Perelman proved the Poincaré conjecture’
express in certain contexts. Prima facie, it seems plausible that Fields Medal recipient
Terence Tao has a rich understanding of the proposition Grigory Perelman proved the
Poincaré conjecture, while a fourteen-year-old not particularly interested in mathe-
matics—very minimal. Nevertheless, as competent English speakers, they would both
agree that this is precisely what is said in the first sentence of the previous paragraph.
There is clearly an epistemic difference between understanding a proposition and
mere linguistic understanding. What is it? Epistemologists of understanding have by
and large been inclined to set this question aside. For example, according to Stephen
Grimm (2011), epistemologists seek to uncover the nature of
understanding of the natural world (broadly understood), and little will be said
about how—if at all—the approaches on offer here might relate, for example,
to the kind of linguistic understanding we have of concepts or meanings…
[because] the way in which we achieve understanding in these areas seems
different enough that it deserves to be dealt with separately (2011, p. 84, our
italics).3
We disagree. At least, we disagree with the thought that understanding what people
tell us (broadly speaking) is interestingly unlike the kind of understanding we have of
the natural world, epistemically speaking.
Here is the plan for the paper. In Sect. 2, we briefly outline some of the key epistemic
features ofwhat epistemologists call objectual understanding—e.g., the kind of under-
standing one might have of a subject matter, such as football or geometry, and how this
is typically thought to differ from (mere) propositional knowledge possession.4 Next,
we show that understanding a proposition is just a special case of objectual under-
standing, viz. the understanding one attains only when one grasps (in an appropriate
way) the relations between the constituents of a body of information. In Sect. 4, we
demonstrate how it is that understanding a proposition and linguistic understanding
are distinct from one another. Nevertheless, the two types of understanding are closely
related; as we argue in Sect. 5, they jointly, and indispensably, contribute to what we
call understanding a communicated thought, an important species of understanding
that is distinct from, but consists of, both.
1 We come back to this question in Sect. 4.
2 We take propositions to be whatever plays the role of contents or objects of attitudes (e.g., belief) and
speech acts (e.g., assertion), and semantic values of utterances of sentences in context. We say more on this
topic in Sect. 3.
3 Grimm uses the term “linguistic understanding” in a very broad sense in which it includes grasping
concepts and understanding propositions as meanings of linguistic expressions. We devote Sect. 4 to argue
that the types of understanding we have of propositions and of linguistic entities are distinct.
4 Though see Kelp (2016) for resistance to this orthodoxy.
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2 The epistemology of objectual understanding
A widely held view in mainstream epistemology is that objectual understanding is
a richer cognitive good than mere propositional knowledge.5 Objectual understand-
ing attributions take the form “S understands ϕ” where ϕ is (or, can be treated as)
as subject matter. “Giles understands algebraic geometry” and “Darla understands
football” are paradigmatic sorts of objectual understanding attributions; note that the
relations between Giles and algebraic geometry and Darla and football (respectively)
are relations between agents and, not explanations (as in the case of understanding-
why)6 but objects—viz, bodies of information. The view that objectual understanding
can be in some way reduced to knowing an aggregate of propositions is—unlike the
corresponding view that understanding-why can be reduced to propositional knowl-
edge—widely rejected,7 and there are three key reasons for this: the argument from
luck, the argument from degrees, and the argument from regress.8
The argument from luck goes as follows: Gettier-style cases feature a kind of
epistemic luck that is widely taken to be incompatible with propositional knowl-
edge (Pritchard 2005, 2015). If (objectual) understanding is a species of propositional
knowledge, we should be able to generate Gettier-style cases for objectual understand-
ing. Butwe cannot. Therefore, objectual understanding is not a species of propositional
knowledge.9
To useKvanvig’s (2003) often-cited example here, suppose the subject matter under
consideration is the “Comanche dominance of the southern plains of North America
from the late seventeenth until the late nineteenth century” (2003, p. 197). A student
checks out and reads a book from the library on this topic, retains the information and
can answer relevant questions afterwards, to the extent that it is natural to attribute
to her an understanding of the relevant subject matter. Here’s the twist: while each
statement in the book read by the student was true, the fact that this is so was the result
of a random and fortuitous glitch at the printers, which by dumb luck corrected for
all the mistakes. As a result, all the true beliefs formed by reading the book are only
accidentally true (e.g. Gettiered). As Kvanvig sees it, this discovery should not lead us
to withdraw the initial claim that the student understands the subject matter in question
even though it should be enough to lead us to deny that the student possesses the
relevant items of propositional knowledge. Accordingly, Kvanvig reasons, objectual
5 For instance, Grimm (2011), Elgin (2009), Zagzebski (2001), Greco (2014), Riggs (2003, 2009), Bengson
and Moffett (2011) and Kvanvig (2017).
6 For a substantial discussion of understanding-why, see Hills (2016).
7 If explanatory understanding is reducible to propositional knowledge, then Khalifa’s (2013) proposal
stands to motivate an avenue for reducing objectual understanding to propositional knowledge by way of
reducing objectual understanding to explanatory understanding.
8 Cf. Kvanvig (2013) for an argument to the effect that understanding, rather than knowledge, has the
property of satisfying curiosity.
9 Zagzebski (2001) and Kvanvig (2003) were among the first to suggest that objectual understanding is
(unlike propositional knowledge) compatible with Gettier-style epistemic luck.
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understanding is (unlike knowledge) compatible with Gettier-style luck,10 and thus,
the former is not a species of the latter.
Variations on the argument from degrees have been widely defended (e.g., Kvanvig
2003; Pritchard 2009; Zagzebski 2001; Riggs 2003; Grimm 2012). The core reason-
ing goes as follows. Objectual understanding is gradient. Whenever one understands
something, we can ask to what degree they understand it. Propositional knowledge is
not gradient in this way. You either know something or you do not: two people can’t
know that something is true to different degrees. This is so even if the two knowers dif-
fer with respect to how well justified they are in believing the target proposition.11 But
if objectual understanding is just a function of knowledge possession—viz., knowl-
edge of a conjunction of propositions—understanding will not be gradient any more
than propositional knowledge of a conjunction is gradient. Therefore, objectual under-
standing is not a species of propositional knowledge.12
Thirdly, the argument from regress proceeds as follows. If possessing objectual
understanding is a matter of knowing propositions, then we should expect that, for
any (understandable) subject matter (or body of information) ϕ, there are some n
propositions p such that (i) p1, p2, …, pn are parts of ϕand (ii) S’s knowing these n
propositions suffices for S’s understanding ϕ. However—and for reasons that paral-
lel the kind of reasoning that features in Lewis Caroll’s (1895) ‘anti-intellectualist’
regress13 (cf., Ryle 1945)—it remains an open question, for any given number of
ϕ-relevant propositions one knows (and for any further item of propositional knowl-
edge one might add to what one already knows), whether one understands ϕ. Just as,
per Carroll and Ryle, drawing an inference plausibly requires some kind of ability,
so does understanding.14 As Kvanvig (2003, p. 192) remarks, one can know various
items of information but “understanding is achieved only when [these] informational
10 As Pritchard (2009) has pointed out, Kvanvig’s case becomes even more compelling if we add a twist
to the details: suppose Kvanvig’s case is modified so that it becomes a barn-façade-style case, where the
relevant epistemic luck at play is environmental rather than intervening. To do this, just imagine the book
is itself a book each proposition of which the author knew (and so, none of which is Gettierized). But, for
the twist, now suppose that this book is surrounded on its shelf by books in the library with inaccurate
accounts of the Comanche dominance of the American plains—placed there by a jokester (who overlooked
only the genuine book picked by the student). While, à la barn façade cases, propositional knowledge is
incompatible with environmental luck— viz., where the belief could easily have been false despite nothing
actually going awry (compare: Russell’s stopped clock case)—it would seem especially strange to deny
that our student understands the Comanche dominance of the American plains simply because he could
have easily read a misleading book. Cf. Grimm (2006) for a challenge to the view that understanding differs
from knowledge in its resilience to epistemic luck.
11 See, however, Pavese (2017) for some resistance to this idea in the context of the relationship between
knowing how and knowing that. For a more general rejection of this idea, see Hetherington’s defence of
epistemic graduatlism (e.g., Hetherington 2001, 2011, 2013). For criticism of Hetherington’s gradualist
position, see e.g., Ginet (2010), Leite (2006), and Faulkner (2003).
12 The degree constraint applies primarily to objectual understanding and is less obvious vis-à-vis explana-
tory understanding (i.e. understanding-why).
13 For some resistance to this line of argument, as well as to Ryle’s variation on it in the case of know-how,
see Pavese (2015).
14 Elgin (2009) makes a similar point in suggesting that possessing objectual understanding is not simply
a matter of believing a long conjunction of relevant propositions.
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items are pieced together by the subject in question”,15 and the mere possession of
such information does not, as this line of argument goes, entail that one is either able
or disposed to do this. (Just imagine, for example, a pupil who fails to understand
geometry despite coming to know, via reliable testimony with no defeaters, a range of
propositions about geometry that a trusted teacher tells him).
What does this ability involve? According to Riggs (2003, pp. 20–21) it involves
seeing how the various parts of the understood subject matter ‘hang together’, some-
thing one does only if one ‘grasps’ the relevant relations between the propositions
making up the subject matter. Thus, as Grimm (2014) puts it: to understand one must
“be able to see or grasp how changes in some of these items will lead (or fail to lead)
to changes in the others”.16 The idea is that S understands ϕ only if S grasps certain
relationships between the relevant parts that constitute ϕ; Kvanvig and Grimm have
referred to what specifically is grasped as coherence-making relations, though how to
best characterise the grasping requirement remains an issue of some controversy.17
3 Understanding of a proposition
The matter of how to understand the “grasping” metaphor has been a central issue
in work on understanding across disciplines.18 For one thing, the grasping metaphor
features prominently in an issue at the intersection of epistemology, the philosophy
of mind and cognitive science—specifically, with regard to what counts as grasping
a concept. However, the question driving this debate can easily be rephrased as a
15 Our italics. The most natural potential rejoinder here by the proponent of knowledge reductivism about
objectual understanding is difficult to spell out in a way such that it would demonstrate that propositional
knowledge would plausibly suffice as a regress stopper. For example, suppose the proponent of knowledge
reductivism insists that the work done by grasping, vis-à-vis piecing together the relevant relations between
propositions, could be accomplished by learning new knowledge of facts, in particular, facts about how
the relevant items of information about the subject matter hang together, e.g., in indicative, deductive and
explanatory support relations. As has been discussed variously in the literature (see, e.g., Kelp 2016; Gordon
2017) such a proposal can then be countered—in a way that bears close semblance to the reasoning Ryle
(1945) gives in his own twist on Carroll’s original regress; see here also Stanley (2011) for discussion—by
pointing out that this further propositional knowledge might well be disconnected from the perspective of
the thinker, such that it would remain an open question whether the subject would understand the subject
matter in question. The relevant comparison with Ryle’s example is as follows: just as it is an open question
whether a student who has memorized modus ponens knows how to draw the relevant inference (when the
time comes), it remains an open question even if we stipulate that the student is furnished with additional
testimonial knowledge about how to do so (see, though, Stanley 2011, Ch. 1 for criticism). It is beyond
what we can do here to review further possible moves in the dialectic between knowledge reductivists and
their critics about objectual understanding. For our purposes, we are advancing this line as one notable line
of argument against knowledge reductivism that has been well established; we are also considering in this
section two additional arguments, either of which would suffice for establishing that it is problematic to
think of objectual understanding as secured by propositional knowledge. Thanks for a reviewer at Synthese
for pressing us on this point. For one notable example to go beyond standard thinking about knowledge
reductivism about understanding, in order to salvage a knowledge-based position, see Kelp (2016) and
Gordon (2017) for critical discussion.
16 See here also Hills (2009) for a similar proposal.
17 For an alternative view, seeKelp (2015), according towhom the understanding-relevant relations between
propositions are best characterised as basing relations.
18 For discussion, see Grimm (2011).
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question about concept possession19 as opposed to a question about grasping, (and
understanding), per se. But what about the debate about how to characterize the epis-
temic relationshipwe have to a propositions and propositional contentswe understand?
Here things are more complicated.
Propositions play a number of central roles in our mental and social lives. They
function as:
• Objects or contents of attitudes like belief, speech acts like assertion, and perhaps
others in each category;
• (Partial) meanings of utterances of declarative sentences, and perhaps others;
• Referents of ‘that’-clauses;
• (Primary?) bearers of truth and falsity, and the modalities of truth and falsity: neces-
sity, possibility, probability (subjective or epistemic, objective or metaphysical);
• What gets assessed in determining the validity of arguments.
(Garcia-Carpintero and Jespersen 2019, p. 1210)
As we noted at the outset, it’s typical of those working on the epistemology of objec-
tual understanding to set the matter of what’s involved in understanding propositions
(viz., what play the above roles) aside as though what would be involved—epistemi-
cally—in such understanding is fundamentally different from what would be involved
epistemically in understanding the ‘natural world’ (Grimm 2011). But why think this,
exactly?
Let us come back to the example we presented briefly in the introduction. Terence
Tao and a fourteen-year-old read an utterance of an English sentence “Grigory Perel-
man proved the Poincaré conjecture.” As a result, they both entertain20 the proposition
Grigory Perelman proved the Poincaré conjecture. Nevertheless, it is at least prima
facie plausible that Terence Tao’s epistemic relation to this proposition is somehow
different than the fourteen-year-old’s (just as TerenceTao’s relation to geometric topol-
ogy is different than the fourteen-year-old’s). The difference plausibly lies in the fact
that Tao has a rich degree of understanding of the discussed proposition (and thewhole
field of geometric topology). The fourteen-year-old, on the other hand, has a minimal
or no understanding of either of these subject matters.
In this section, we would like to defend two theses:
Weaker thesis: the kind of understanding we aim to have of propositions is similar
to the kind of understanding-as-grasping that contemporary epistemologists call
objectual understanding.
Stronger thesis: the kind of understanding we aim to have of propositions is
type-identical to the kind of understanding-as-grasping that contemporary epis-
temologists call objectual understanding.
We would like to keep our discussion as neutral as possible with regard to the vast
and venerable debate about the nature of propositions. The only assumption we make
19 See here, for example, Bealer (1998), Boghossian (2003), Peacocke (1989), Millar (1994).
20 We use entertain here as an umbrella term for whatever type of cognitive attitude one has towards the
proposition after comprehending an utterance of a sentence expressing this proposition. Importantly, we do
not claim that entertaining is a sui generis kind of mental attitude.
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is that propositions are structured, i.e., that they “are complex entities, entities having
parts or constituents, where the constituents are bound together in a certain way” (King
2019).21,22
A convincing argument suggesting that propositions (or at least propositional
contents of mental attitudes) are complex and structured entities appeals to their pro-
ductivity and systematicity.23 Propositional contents are productive because anyone
with basic conceptual repertoire can, at least in principle, entertain infinitely many of
them. If you can entertain a proposition that the chair stands next to the table, and you
have a concept of SOFA, you can entertain a proposition that the sofa stands next to the
table, etc. Propositional contents are systematic because “…our ability to entertain…
one propositional content is intrinsically connected to our ability to entertain other…
propositional contents, so that our ability to entertain the one automatically implies
that we can entertain the others” (Duncan 2018, p. 353). If you can entertain the propo-
sition that a chair stands next to the table you can, by the same token, entertain the
proposition that the table stands next to the chair.
This said, let’s return to the main question of this section: how should we char-
acterise the epistemic relationship we have to a proposition we take ourselves to
understand? We suggest that, given the assumption that propositions are structured, a
(singular) propositional attitude relation is off the table; after all, if we assume (for
reductio) that we understand a proposition p just when we stand in some propositional
attitude relation to p, we find ourselves left unavoidably with a remainder: namely,
what epistemic relation do we have vis-à-vis the constituents of p? Recall that pro-
ductivity and systematicity rationalise that we grasp p by grasping the constituents of
p and relations obtaining between them.
In light of this worry, we might be tempted toward an obvious sort of improve-
ment—specifically, we might suppose that we can preserve a propositional-attitude
approach and (unlike the previous view considered) cover for the remainder that was
the cognitive relationship we must bear to the constituents of p. The idea would be
something like the following: S understands p just when S (i) bears some propositional
attitude relation to p; and (ii) bears some propositional attitude relations r1 … rn to
the constituents of p.
An initial reaction here is to consider whether (ii) on this amended view would
make (i) redundant. But ultimately, this doesn’t much matter. The problem with the
21 In fact, our account of understanding of a proposition does not require any substantive metaphysical
commitment to the “hidden natures” of propositions. It is compatible with deflationary views about proposi-
tions according to which either propositions themselves are not structured but they exist only as represented
by structured representational vehicles (Garcia-Carpintero ms, p. 3) or “propositions are abstractions from
(possible) mental state tokens that represent exactly the same” (Grzankowski and Buchanan 2019, p. 3160)
and thus “inherit” the structure from these tokens. If representational vehicles but not propositions are struc-
tured, our account would be more precisely characterized as an account of understanding a propositional
content of a vehicle. Everything we’ll say can be stated by assuming this more deflationary stance.
22 More concessively still, we commit ourselves neither to a view that propositions are mind-independent
entities (such as facts) nor to its negation (see, e.g., Collins 2018).
23 Again, it might be the case that only representational vehicles but not propositions are structured and,




amended view is that there is no suitable way to fill in the details that will not lead the
amended view to collapse into the aggregate view we considered in Sect. 2.
Recall that a fundamental problem for the aggregate view (vis-à-vis objectual under-
standing in epistemology) highlighted the sense in which objectual understanding
appears to have a grasping condition as a necessary condition, and further, that such a
condition (as per the regress problem) will not plausibly be satisfied simply by requir-
ing that the agent know an appropriate number of propositions. The subject should
also grasp the way in which the constituents of the subject matter “hang together.” In
the case of propositions it is relatively easy to fill in the details of the relevant grasping
condition: grasping the way in which constituents of propositions “hang together” is
just grasping the ways in which these proposition are structured, i.e., what are the
relations relating their constituents.24
From here it’s not hard to see that understanding a proposition is looking quite a
bit like the kind of understanding epistemologists call objectual understanding. Even
more, as we’ll see, understanding of a proposition seems to be compatible withGettier-
style cases that serve to undermine propositional knowledge.
Let’s consider a case structurally similar to Kvanvig’s (2003) library book case
(Sect. 2). Suppose Alex is studying for a biology exam. A disgruntled employee at
a company that makes the biology textbooks that Alex’s class is using has tampered
with the chapter on the structure and function of the cell, switching around some of
the information. Alex, fortunately, grabs a book in which the disgruntled employee
attempted to mix the definitions around but accidentally mixed them back in the orig-
inal order, leaving the book that Alex grabs with correct descriptions of the elements
of a cell. Alex’s acquisition of the series of concepts (including NUCLEUS, CYTO-
PLASM, and MITOCHONDRION) is thus unsafe. Suppose that Alex studies the
textbook carefully and is able to use these previously unfamiliar concepts to entertain
propositions about cell structure. Moreover, if she hears an utterance of the sentence
“Mitochondria contain no DNA” she can tell that the proposition expressed by this
sentence is false, just as she can tell that the propositions expressed by the following
sentences are true:
(1) Cytoplasm is enclosed by the cell membrane.
(2) Eukaryotic cells contain membrane-bound nuclei.
(3) Mitochondria produce most of the cell energy supply.
In short, and in a familiar sort of way, Alex has come (thanks to her biology textbook)
to understand propositions expressed by utterances of sentences (1–3), even though the
24 Our story fits particularly well with a solution to the so called problem of the Unity of propositions offered
by Eklund (2019) (for an exhaustive discussion of the problem see Gaskin 2008). Here’s the problem: “How
can there be this complex, the proposition, made up of its constituents, as opposed to merely (the collection
of) the constituents themselves?” (Eklund 2019, p. 1236). A somehow classical worry is that the problem
cannot be solved without falling into a vicious constitution regress. Let’s take the proposition that a is F.
We might assume that it has two constituents: a and F. But what is the difference between this proposition
and a mere collection of a and F? We have to say that in the proposition a instantiates F and thus that the
proposition has a further constituent: the instantiation relation R. But in this case, what is the difference
between this proposition and a mere collection of: a, F, and R? etc. Eklund’s solution to this problem is
to take the relation relating the constituents as primitive and not as a further constituent of the proposition:
“what accounts for the constituents being combined into the unity they are is how they are related. What
would the remaining worry be?” (Eklund 2019, p. 1244).
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unsafe acquisition of the relevant information undermines her would-be propositional
knowledge of the definitions of constituents of the propositions expressed by (1–3).
Taking stock then, understanding of a proposition is, like the kind of objectual
understanding that features in mainstream epistemology, (i) not reducible simply to
the possession of a propositional attitude or propositional attitudes; (ii) has a grasping
condition as a necessary condition; (iii) is compatible with knowledge-undermining
epistemic luck. This concludes our argument for the Weaker thesis.
Can we go further and establish the Stronger thesis as well? If the stronger thesis
is right, then understanding a proposition involves a kind of apprehension of the way
the propositional constituents stand in relation to each other that is akin to the way
understanding a body of information or a subject matter (e.g., algebraic geometry)
involves a kind of apprehension of how the facts constituting this subject matter stand
in relation to each other. Here the degree-based ex-ante constraint on objectual under-
standing noted in Sect. 2 is relevant. If it turns out that, for example, scientific theories,
but not propositions, can be understood to greater or lesser degrees, this would surely
count against the Stronger thesis.
AsRiggs (2009, p. 7) notes “the amount of information present in someone’s [objec-
tual] understanding can vary:”25 this will be the case, for instance, when we compare
the understanding of a housefire possessed by a novice fireman as opposed to the
understanding of a housefire possessed by an expert in exothermal reactions.26 In this
respect, objectual understanding can vary along what we might call the information
dimension. But the degrees of understanding possessed by two individuals might also
diverge alongwhat we’ll call the action dimension. As Elgin (2009) notes: “the student
who understands geometry can do more with it than the student who just knows all the
axioms, the main theorems and their derivations.” Stronger thesis (that understanding
a proposition is a special case of objectual understanding) predicts, then, that for two
individuals, A and B, A’s understanding of some proposition p should be able, in prin-
ciple, to diverge from B’s understanding of p along both the informational and action
dimensions.
Each of these points can be made rather straightforwardly. Firstly, the point about
informational variance: consider that Terence Tao, as well as most of his first-year
UCLA students, understand the proposition Grigory Perelman proved the Poincaré
conjecture. Suppose a first-year student at UCLA, Johnny, knows the following things:
that the Poincaré conjecture was a problem in geometric topology that’s usually illus-
trated by wrapping a string around a three dimensional object, and that proving the
conjecture involved the application of a mathematical method called the Ricci Flow.27
All of this information was gleaned by Johnny (who is only beginning his maths
degree) from an article in the New Yorker, written for a general audience.28
While Terence Tao and Johnny both understand Grigory Perelman proved the
Poincaré conjecture, Terence is in a much better position to see how the constituents
25 Our italics.
26 See Carter (2017) for a more detailed analysis of this case.
27 See Perelman (2002). For an overview of the Ricci Flow, developed by Richard Hamilton, and its
applications to the Poincaré conjecture, see Chow et al. (2006).
28 Nasar and Gruber (2006). Manifold Destiny, The New Yorker. August, 28, 44–57.
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of this proposition hang together; (after all, Terence, unlike Johnny, has the informa-
tion necessary to appreciate a more specific sort of thing that would be involved in
developing a proof of the Poincaré conjecture). Johnny’s comparatively impoverished
understanding of the proposition is betrayed by the fact that the information he pos-
sesses, and which bears on his understanding the proposition, gives him a significantly
less rich picture of the subject matter of the proposition Grigory Perelman proved the
Poincaré conjecture.
Not only can the understanding of a proposition (like understanding a body of
information) two individuals possess diverge along an informational dimension (as
we saw here) but it can do so as well along what we called the action dimension. Just
as, à la Elgin (2009), understanding geometry allows one to do more with it than can
one who merely knows axioms, main theorems and their derivations, Terence Tao can
do more with his understanding of Grigory Perelman proved the Poincaré conjecture
than Johnny can. Terence’s, but not Johnny’s, understanding of the proposition that
Grigory Perelman proved the Poincaré conjecture includes items of information A, B,
and C, where A, B, and C are pieces of information about what Perelman must have
proved to have proven the Poincaré conjecture. Terence, but not Johnny, can use A,
B and C as premises in his practical reasoning, conditioned on his understanding that
Grigory Perelman proved the Poincaré conjecture.
In yet another instance, then, objectual understanding and understanding of a propo-
sition fail to come apart. This concludes our argument for the Stronger thesis: the
kind of understanding we aim to have of propositions is type-identical to the kind
of understanding-as-grasping that contemporary epistemologists call objectual under-
standing.
4 Linguistic understanding versus understanding of a proposition
Since one of the main roles of propositions is “to be the meanings of sentences (in
context), or at least the contents expressible by sentences” (Collins 2018, p. 3) it
is fairly easy to confuse the type of understanding relation we have to propositions
with what is commonly discussed in philosophy of language under the label linguistic
understanding. These two types of understanding are, however, importantly different.
Some popular recent theories identify linguistic understanding of an utterance
expressing pwith: (i) knowledge that the speaker said that p (Evans 1982, p. 311; Heck
1995, p. 84), (ii) “conscious awareness” (Hunter 1998, p. 560) or “quasi-perception”
(Fricker 2003, p. 341) that the speaker said that p, (iii) a belief that p (Millikan 2004,
p. 121; cf., Mandelbaum 2014), or (iv) a state of entertaining the content p (Longworth
2018, p. 822).29
29 It is not our goal in this paper to discuss and assess these views. Even if neither of them offers the
accurate characterization of the phenomenon of linguistic understanding, they are all on the right track and
thus sufficient for our purposes. For a detailed discussion of the limitations of these views and an alternative
proposal see Grodniewicz (ms, 2020).
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What is common to all these views is that they characterise linguistic understanding
as a mental state through which the hearer30 represents the content of a linguistic
utterance.31 An ability to understand an utterance is thus an ability to recognize what
is being said or what is themeaning of a given utterance of a sentence in a language one
knows. In the case of assertoric utterances, it is an ability to recognize what proposition
was expressed through a given utterance.32
It is, thus, not difficult to demonstrate the difference between linguistic under-
standing and understanding of a proposition. Let’s return again to our example of the
proposition Grigory Perelman proved the Poincaré conjecture (p). This proposition
can be expressed by utterances of sentences of different languages, in particular by an
utterance of an English sentence (EN) and a Polish sentence (PL).
(EN) Grigory Perelman proved the Poincaré conjecture.
(PL) Grigorij Perelman udowodnił hipotezę Poincarégo.
To demonstrate that understanding a proposition and linguistic understanding are dif-
ferent phenomena, we will use a comparison class of four protagonists: Terence Tao,33
a monolingual English fourteen-year-old not particularly interested in mathematics, a
monolingual Polish mathematician specializing in geometric topology, and a mono-
lingual Polish fourteen-year-old not particularly interested in mathematics.
As we argued in the previous section, both Tao and the Polish topologist understand
p. They grasp and can explain what the proof would require, what light it sheds
on various related problems in topology, etc. At the same time, Tao lacks linguistic
understanding of (PL) while the monolingual Polish mathematician lacks linguistic
understanding of (EN). Upon hearing utterances of respective sentences in languages
they do not speak, they would not realise that what has been just said was p.
The situation is different in the case of monolingual teenagers. Let’s take as an
example themonolingualEnglish teenager, Emily. Emily is capable of linguistic under-
standing of (EN) but incapable of linguistic understanding of (PL). Utterances of (PL)
would sound to her like an incomprehensible babble. Even if she were able to guess
that what she heard was an utterance of a sentence in a foreign language (as opposed
to, say, gibberish), she would have problems detecting word boundaries, not to men-
tion retrieving meanings of the words uttered or for that matter the whole utterance.
Additionally, lacking any competence with geometric topology, Emily has no (or only
minimal) understanding of p. Nonetheless, upon hearing an utterance of (EN), she
recognises that what has been said was that one Grigory Perelman (whoever that was)
30 For convenience, in most our examples we will focus on cases of hearing and linguistic understanding
of speech. All that we say is mutatis mutandis applicable to linguistic understanding of written word, sign
languages such as ASL, etc.
31 The content is represented either directly, i.e., simply as p (Longworth 2018;Millikan 2004) or indirectly,
i.e., as said by a given speaker (Evans 1982; Heck 1995; Hunter 1998; Fricker 2003).
32 Crucially, the minimal condition on linguistic understanding is stronger than mere recognition of a
linguistic form or recognition of an utterance of a sentence in a given language as an utterance of a sentence
in this language. One can, for example, recognize utterances of French sentences (i.e., they can tell that
someone speaks French) without recognizing what is being said (i.e., without linguistic understanding of
this utterances).




proved (whatever that takes) something called “Poincaré conjecture.” Obviously, if
she did not hear about Poincaré before, she would not recognise his name in the sen-
tence. She might take “poincare” to be the proper name of the conjecture or, if this
is the first time she encounters the concept of CONJECTURE, she could have even
falsely assume that what Perelman proved was something called “Poincareconjec-
ture.” Nevertheless, she could later on use this information to start reading about the
mysterious things she has heard about and soon learn a lot about Perelman, Poincaré,
and geometric topology. After some time of devoted studies she could acquire a rich
understanding of p and the whole field of topology, possibly becoming one of Tao’s
most promising students.
To sum up. We demonstrated that it is possible to understand a proposition while
being unable to linguistically understand utterances of sentences of a given language
which express this proposition. It is also possible to linguistically understandutterances
of sentences of a given language which express a proposition but fail to understand
(or have only a very minimal understanding of) this proposition. This concludes our
argument for the divergence between linguistic understanding and understanding of a
proposition.
5 Understanding a communicated thought
In Sect. 3 we have argued that the type of understanding we have of propositions
is just a special case of objectual understanding, and in the previous section, that it
differs importantly from linguistic understanding. Nevertheless, the fact that these two
types of understanding differ does not mean that they do not often co-occur. In fact,
cases in which they co-occur are particularly interesting from the point of view of our
successful and fruitful communication.34 Arguably, interlocutors communicate most
effectively when they not only understand the linguistic expressions used by each
other but also understand the things being said, i.e., how the propositions expressed
represent the world. We call this understanding a communicated thought.35
If u is an utterance of a sentence in a given language, and p is the proposition
expressed by u in a given context:
Understanding a communicated thought requires:
a) linguistic understanding of u, and
b) (some level of)36 understanding of p
34 We do not pretend that we provide here sufficient or even necessary conditions for communicative
success. All we say is that the type of understanding which we characterize below is among the important
factors contributing to communicative success (at least in some situations).
35 The phenomenon we characterize below could be more precisely called understanding of a thought as
communicated through a given utterance. As we have demonstrated above, one could understand a commu-
nicated thought (e.g., p) but not as communicated through a given utterance [compare Tao’s understanding
of p as expressed by (EN) but not (PL)]. The more accurate name is, however, quite a mouthful, so we will
stick to the shorter version: understanding a communicated thought.
36 As we argued in Sect. 3, understanding a proposition, just like other kinds of objectual understanding,
is a gradable matter.
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It’s easy to apply this template account to the cases of our protagonists from the
previous sections. Our u will, again, be either (EN) or (PL), and our p will be Grigory
Perelman proved the Poincaré Conjecture. Tao will have rich understanding of the
communicated thought if he hears (EN). He has linguistic understanding of (EN) and
rich understanding of the proposition p. However, despite his deep understanding of p,
Tao will not understand the communicated thought if he hears (PL), because he does
not understand Polish. As we see, the first way in which one may fail to understand
the communicated thought is by failing to understand the utterance through which a
given thought was communicated.
There is, obviously, another way in which one might fail to understand the commu-
nicated thought. It is demonstrated by the example of the English speaking teenager,
Emily. Despite her linguistic understanding of (EN), Emily barely understands the
thought communicated through the use of (EN) because she barely understands propo-
sition p.
While arguing for the Stronger thesis in Sect. 3, we were comparing Tao’s rich
understanding of p with his first-year student’s (Johnny’s) understanding of the same
proposition. Our definition accounts for the fact that Johnny’s epistemic standing
towards p as communicated through an utterance of (EN) is different to both Tao’s as
well as Emily’s. Unlike Emily, Johnny has considerable understanding of the thought
communicated through the use of (EN) because he has a considerable degree of under-
standing of p. Nevertheless, his understanding of a communicated thought is not as
rich as Tao’s because his understanding of the proposition p is not as rich as Tao’s.
Since, as we demonstrated in Sect. 3, the type of understanding we have of proposi-
tions is gradable, and since it contributes to the understanding of the communicated
thought, the understanding of the communicated thought is itself a gradable matter.
6 Concluding remarks
The goal of this paper was twofold. First, we argued that the understanding one has
of a proposition or a propositional content of a representational vehicle is a type of
what contemporary epistemologists characterize as objectual understanding. Second,
we demonstrated that even though this type of understanding differs from linguistic
understanding, in many instances of successful communication these two types of
understanding jointly contribute to understanding a communicated thought. At the
same time,we think that our discussionmakes a case for a closer collaboration between
philosophers interested in communication (linguistic communication in particular)
and epistemologists. It is through paying attention to both these research fields at the
same time that we will be able to tackle the knotty and multidimensional problem of
understanding in human interactions.
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